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The idea 
The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East1 has been around for 
quite some time. Over the years, there have been several regional and multilateral initiatives. 
The first dates back to 1974, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution tabled by Egypt and Iran. Israel abstained. In 1980, Israel submitted its own 
proposal, but later withdrew it and said it would prefer direct negotiations with the states in 
the region. But since the late 1970s, almost every session of the General Assembly has 
called for negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It is also enshrined 
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), which set out the terms for ending 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait; the Resolution recalls “the objective of the establishment of a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East” and the need to work towards 
the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. 2  
The Review Conferences to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 19953 and 2000 
also called for negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and the final 
document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference4 underscores the importance of establishing 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, and in the Middle East in particular. The final 
document also suggests organizing a conference in 2012 to consider “practical steps” toward 
these goals, but neither a location nor a facilitator for such a conference has yet been 
announced. In addition, on September 24, 2010, the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution5 welcoming the initiatives on the 
establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East; at 
the same time, however, the Conference rejected a resolution6 that expressed “concern 
about the Israeli nuclear capabilities.”  
The rationale 
In March 2011, in response to Muammar el-Qaddafi’s violent attacks on a popular uprising 
against his repressive regime, an international coalition enforced a no-fly zone over Libya 
and flew air raids to protect civilians and support opposition forces. Some observers have 
suggested that both North Korea and Iran might conclude that Qaddafi’s fatal error was 
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giving up Libya’s nuclear program in 2004,7 leaving his regime open to attack by international 
forces. By this logic, the international community would not have intervened if Libya had a 
nuclear weapons program. 
This interpretation is wrong for several reasons. First, possessing nuclear weapons does not 
prevent conventional war or international intervention. Nuclear powers took part in the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Yom Kippur War, both the Soviet and U.S. wars in 
Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. Nuclear weapons did not deter India and Pakistan from 
waging armed conflict over Kargil. This is especially true if there is an asymmetric 
relationship between powers, when one side has a huge conventional and nuclear superiority 
and the other has only a tiny nuclear capability. Powers with overwhelming superiority would 
not be deterred from using force against weaker opponents. North Korea and Iran should not 
rely on their nuclear bombs! Small states are not deterred from fighting big nuclear powers - 
big states are even less deterred from fighting small nuclear powers! 
Furthermore, in both North-East Asia and the Middle East, the United States provides 
“extended deterrence” or a “nuclear umbrella” to protect its allies from a nuclear threat or 
attack. The U.S. has to demonstrate credibly that it would use overwhelming conventional 
and nuclear force if an ally were attacked with nuclear weapons. In general, major nuclear 
powers are more rather than less likely to use force against smaller states that develop 
nuclear weapons or are considered to be a risk. 
This might well have been the chief reason Qaddafi abandoned his nuclear program in 2004; 
he may have believed that he was less secure with the bomb than without it. A similar fear 
may have persuaded Iran to suspend its own nuclear weapons program in 2003. 
Based on this analysis, most of the parties to the NPT decided to sign and ratify the treaty, 
including European states like Germany and Sweden. They had both negative and positive 
incentives to do so. Parties to the NPT without nuclear weapons capabilities would be less 
likely to be a target of a nuclear attack, and they would also have better access to peaceful 
nuclear energy. 
What does this mean for prospects for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East? 
Several states in the region have the potential to achieve nuclear capabilities, and at the 
same time become targets for nuclear strikes. It has long been assumed that Israel has 
nuclear weapons capabilities. If Iran obtains them as well, it might become a potential target 
for Israel and the United States. It also could provoke a nuclear arms race in the region, 
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which in turn would endanger Israel if it lost its regional nuclear monopoly.8 A recent Israeli 
study9 warned that Egyptian or Saudi procurement of nuclear weapons could also lead to 
decreased Jewish migration to Israel and a lower rate of investment. In this scenario, all 
states in the region would be losers. By the same token, they all would benefit from a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone. It would give Israel an incentive to abandon its nuclear weapons 
rather moving toward a painstaking policy of deterrence and a costly arms race. In this case, 
Israel would have to open up its nuclear program to make its deterrence goals explicit. 
The concept 
What would a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone look like? 
A number of nuclear-weapon-free zones already exist. Article 52 of the United Nations 
Charter allows “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies,” and Article VII of the 
NPT10 recognizes the “right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to 
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The most 
relevant examples for the Middle East of nuclear-weapon-free zones include the Treaties of 
Tlatelolco in Latin America, Pelindaba in Africa, Rarotonga in the Pacific, Bangkok in South 
East Asia, and Semei in Central Asia. They are all different, but they share some common 
features. For example, in each zone, members are not allowed to use, develop, or deploy 
nuclear weapons. A zone cannot be self-declared but must be recognized by the UN General 
Assembly. 
Such zones are small models of a world free of nuclear weapons. Member States have to 
accept intrusive verification measures, such as implementing the additional protocol to the 
NPT, forfeiting any fissile material, banning nuclear weapons tests and implementing the 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). 
It goes without saying that the main difference between a nuclear weapons-free world and a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone is that in the latter case, nuclear weapons states continue to exist. 
Thus another critical dimension of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is that nuclear weapons 
states must guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack members 
of the zone. Negative Security Assurances (NSA) are enshrined in the protocols of the 
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nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, and if ratified, they are legally binding.11 The 2010 NPT 
Review Conference also made an important link to Negative Security Assurances, stressing 
the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon states in receiving unequivocal, legally binding 
assurances from nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against these zones. 
U.S. President Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review12 (NPR) of 2010 included such Negative 
Security Assurances with two exceptions: states have to be (a) party to the NPT and (b) in 
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. When Russia ratified the 
Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba in March 2011, it made more sweeping exemptions. It 
excluded (with respect of the island of Diego Garcia) “the cases of invasion or any other 
armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its 
allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a 
non-nuclear-weapons State party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-
weapon State.” In the past, the United States applied similar exemptions to all Negative 
Security Assurances. 
The 2010 NPR does not endorse no first use of nuclear weapons. It reserves the right of the 
United States to make any adjustment in its assurances that may be warranted by the 
evolution and proliferation of the threat from biological weapons and U.S. capacities to 
counter that threat.13 A no-first-use policy would facilitate the creation of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones since it would exclude a preemptive strike against any nuclear weapons installations. 
In sum, there are two general concepts for regional security: one with nuclear weapons and 
one without. The concept of “extended deterrence” entails the promise, explicit or not, of big 
nuclear powers being willing to use nuclear weapons if a nuclear attack against an ally 
occurs or if one is imminent. This “nuclear umbrella” should protect allies of the United States 
in various regions, such as East Asia or the Middle East. In contrast, the concept of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone with Negative Security Assurances entails the pledge not to use 
nuclear weapons against any member of the zone. 
The NPT Review Conference of 2010 endorses not only a Middle East zone free of nuclear 
weapons but also one free of weapons of mass destruction altogether. Since several states 
in the region are supposed to have stocks of chemical or biological weapons, it makes sense 
to extend the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to one free of all 
                                                     
11
 Marco Roscini, Negative Security Assurances in the Protocols Additional to the Treaties Establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zones, Heinz Gärtner (ed.), Obama and the Bomb: The Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, (Peter Lang: New York-
Frankfurt/Main-Vienna, 2011). 
12
 Department of Defense, United States of America, Nuclear Posture Review, Report, April 2010. 
13
 This appears to be an unnecessary exception since the origin of a biological weapons attack is hard to detect. Moreover, 
biological weapons would not be effective military or terrorist tools because they would be too slow for a successful attack. See 
also Michael S. Gerson, No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy, International Security, Vol 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), 
pp. 7-47. 
 6 
WMD. Neither Egypt nor Syria has signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
they have signed but not ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.14 In this case, the 
Negative Security Assurances could be broadened into no first use of weapons of mass 
destruction.15 Then the rationale of the U.S. NPR to reserve its right to use nuclear weapons 
against biological weapons would lose relevance and the United States could apply a no-
first-use policy to the region. A zone free of WMD in the Middle East would give Israel the 
opportunity to join the NPT and the Arab states to join the chemical and biological 
conventions. Steps toward such a zone could be seen as confidence-building measures and 
as part of the peace process. Israel also has to feel safe and its right to exist must be 
recognized in the region before it might agree to a zone free of all WMD. 
The process 
The creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East will not 
happen overnight. Rather, the process well may take many years, with various preparatory 
meetings and follow-up conferences. It might be similar to the Helsinki process of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which went on for almost 20 
years with both partial successes and backlashes until the collapse of communism in 
Europe.  As it did in the Helsinki process, Austria as a neutral state could play a constructive 
role as host, facilitator, mediator and provider of good offices in the creation of a zone free of 
WMD in the Middle East. A first litmus test will be the 2012 conference proposed in the final 
document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. So far neither a facilitator nor a location has 
been identified. Israel’s participation is still uncertain and without Israel the conference would 
be a failure. If nothing happens in 2012, the 2015 NPT Review Conference would have to 
make a new attempt. Peace in the Middle East cannot and should not be a precondition for 
creating a zone free of WMD. 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung  
Eine nuklearwaffenfreie Zone im Mittleren Osten 
Die Idee einer nuklearwaffenfreien Zone im Mittleren Osten gibt es seit Mitte der siebziger 
Jahre und taucht seither in verschiedenen Resolutionen der Vereinten Nationen auf. Die 
Überprüfungskonferenzen des Atomwaffensperrvertrages (NPT) 1995, 2000 und 
insbesondere 2010 unterstreichen die Wichtigkeit von nuklearwaffenfreien Zonen im 
Allgemeinen und einer im Mittleren Osten im Besonderen. 2012 soll eine Konferenz zu dem 
Thema organisiert werden. 
Alle Mitglieder einer nuklearwaffenfreien Zone würden davon profitieren. Keines hätte einen 
Vorteil von einem nuklearen Rüstungswettlauf. Israel würde sein nukleares Monopol 
verlieren. Staaten mit Nuklearwaffen in der Region könnten zu potentiellen Zielen der großen 
Nuklearwaffenmächte werden, zumal die USA ihren Nuklearschirm im Sinne der erweiterten 
Abschreckung über verbündete Staaten aufspannen. 
Nuklearwaffenfreie Zonen beinhalten negative Sicherheitsgarantien, mit denen die 
Nuklearwaffenmächte das rechtlich verbindliche Versprechen abgeben, gegen solche Zonen 
keine Nuklearwaffen einzusetzen. Hier steht also die Zusicherung, auf den Einsatz von 
Nuklearwaffen zu verzichten, gegen diejenige, mit ihrem Einsatz im Falle der erweiterten 
Abschreckung zu drohen. 
Da einige Staaten der Region andere Massenvernichtungswaffenprogramme (chemische 
und biologische) betrieben haben, müsste eine nuklearwaffenfreie Zone auf eine Zone ohne 
Massenvernichtungswaffen ausgedehnt werden. Die USA behalten sich in ihrer nuklearen 
Sicherheitsstrategie vor, künftig in extremen Fällen Nuklearwaffen auch gegen andere 
Massenvernichtungswaffen einzusetzen. Eine Verwirklichung einer Zone ohne 
Massenvernichtungswaffen im Mittleren Osten würde es ermöglichen, dass nukleare 
negative Sicherheitsgarantien auf einen Verzicht auf den Ersteinsatz von 
Massenvernichtungswaffen ausgedehnt werden. 
Die Umsetzung einer solchen Zone kann nicht von heute auf morgen geschehen. Sie wäre 
ein jahrelanger Prozess, während dessen Vorbereitungs- und Nachfolgekonferenzen 
stattfinden. Vorbild kann der KSZE-Prozess der siebziger und achtziger Jahre sein, der nach 
fast 20 Jahren zum Erfolg führte. Österreich hatte damals im Rahmen der Gruppen der 
neutralen und nicht-paktgebundenen Staaten eine konstruktive Rolle gespielt. Es könnte als 
neutraler Vermittler oder Gastgeber bei der Schaffung einer Zone ohne 
Massenvernichtungswaffen eine ähnliche Rolle übernehmen. Ein Testfall könnte schon die 
Konferenz 2012 werden. Sollte sie scheitern, dann müsste die Überprüfungskonferenz des 
NPT 2015 wieder einmal einen neuen Anlauf nehmen. 
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